China’s structural transformation: reaching potential GDP in the financial services sector by Sara Hsu & Alba Carolina Melchor Simon
RESEARCH Open Access
China’s structural transformation: reaching
potential GDP in the financial services
sector
Sara Hsu1* and Alba Carolina Melchor Simon2
* Correspondence:
hsus@newpaltz.edu
1State University of New York at
New Paltz, 600 Hawk Drive, JFT 804,
New Paltz, NY 12561, USA
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
China’s economy faces the daunting challenge of shifting from a manufacturing-based
economy to a service-based economy. Reforms in the services sector are slated to
continue to take place in the coming years, including in the financial sector. In this
paper, we explore China’s success and challenges with structural change and then take
a closer look at the financial services sector to find out where reforms have occurred,
where the potential lies, and what the future will bring. We first describe structural
change with regard to growth and TFP (total factor productivity), then as it applies to
China. We examine China’s financial services sector. Next, we calculate potential GDP of
the financial services sector now and with the implementation of expected reforms. We
find that, given even conservative estimates, the value added of the financial
intermediation sector could double, as labor, capital, technology, and elasticity respond
to liberalization policies. Whether potential GDP under reforms is reached is another
question; therefore, we recommend that China both increase the pace of
implementation, focusing in particular on reducing the oligopoly in the banking sector,
increasing investment options by reforming its bond and equity markets, and
enhancing innovation in the financial sphere while controlling for risk.
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Background
China’s economy faces the daunting challenge of shifting from a manufacturing-based
economy to a service-based economy. Reforms in the services sector are slated to con-
tinue to take place in the coming years, including in the financial sector. In this paper,
we explore China’s success and challenges with structural change, then take a closer
look at the financial services sector to find out where reforms have occurred, where
the potential lies, and what the future will bring. There is little written about the po-
tential impacts of opening up China’s financial sector on GDP and potential GDP, yet
it is critical to understand the role that China’s massive targeted structural change will
have upon growth and other factors. This paper seeks to fill the gap in the literature
on the economic impact China’s financial service sector reforms can have.
Structural change is a complex process that transforms an economy in a basic manner.
While China has been successful in transforming from an agricultural-based economy to
a manufacturing-based economy, it is unclear to what extent China will be successful in
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moving to a service-based economy. China’s financial sector in particular faces challenges
since financial institutions are closely tied to the state, whose institutional structure has
prevented improvements in efficiency.
Multiple reforms are expected to occur in the financial sector, but the current eco-
nomic slowdown, coupled with enduring state interests, present barriers to change.
Still, if the reforms were successful, they could potentially generate far more GDP than
they do at present. Better productivity, greater employment, and more capital in the
banking sector alone could lead to large economic gains. In what follows, we first
describe structural change and TFP, as well as structural change as it applies to China,
then examine China’s financial services sector. Next, we calculate potential GDP of the
financial services sector now and with the implementation of expected reforms. We
conclude with policy recommendations.
Structural change, TFP, and growth
The relationship between economic growth, structural transformation and TFP has
been examined to some extent in the literature. This relationship has been illustrated
through different models and results in different conclusions depending on countries
and sectors examined.
Bah and Brada (2009) estimate total factor productivity at the sectoral level, developing a
model that estimates sectoral TFP from data on sectoral employment and GDP per capita,
in order to examine structural change in Eastern Europe. The authors evaluate TFP in
industry, service, and agriculture, finding that the former communist regimes in Eastern
Europe have experienced structural change through the services sector, and that TFP is
growing rapidly relative to that in Austria. Bah and Brada (2014) look at labor market devel-
opments in former communist nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, specifically
studying the interaction between aggregate output and employment, and later analyzing the
impact of privatization on employment outcomes in the context of sectoral restructuring.
Buera and Kaboski (2012) analyze the role of specialized high-skilled labor in service
sector growth in the USA. The authors create a theory that reflects the shifting demand
toward more skill-intensive output as productivity increases. This provides the link
between skill accumulation and growth of the services sector.
Duarte and Restuccia (2010) examine sectoral labor productivity to explain structural
transformation, finding that the productivity catch-up in industry, across countries and
relative to the USA, explains about half the gains in productivity across countries. Using a
general equilibrium model, the authors also conclude that low productivity in the services
sector and lack of convergence explains stagnation observed across countries.
Ngai and Pissarides (2007) construct a model in which structural change is driven by
sectoral labor reallocation dependent on rates of TFP growth. The authors find that on
the balanced growth path, labor that produces consumer goods moves to sectors with
low TFP growth rates, while employment shares of intermediate and capital goods
remain constant. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) analyze sectoral differences in factor
proportions within a two-sector general equilibrium model, showing that as sectoral
levels of TFP diverge or capital accumulates, structural change takes place. As in Ngai
and Pissarides, Agemoglu, and Guerrieri show that structural change is driven by
changes in the relative price of factors.
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There is little written on the financial services sector per se and structural transform-
ation. Much of the emphasis with respect to financial sector change is associated with
regulatory reform and liberalization. This has been discussed with particular reference to
developed economies, such as the USA, the UK, and Europe (see Volcker 2012, Bhatia
2007 and Riksbank 2015), especially in the wake of the global crisis, but not with reference
to TFP or the structural transition to a service sector-based economy.
Structural change theory and application to China
Structural change is an essential, multi-faceted component of development. This is a
broad term that implies some important assumptions. Most importantly, while stages
of growth theories a la Rostow and others have been deemed too constricting in their
approach, neglecting the variation, dynamics, and fluctuations experienced by developing
economies, economists continue to view structural change as a movement from a primary
sector-based economy to a manufacturing sector-based economy, and ultimately to a
service-based economy, or from a traditional sector-based economy to a modern sector-
based economy. The reason for this assumption is that structural change is thought to
occur in conjunction with an upgrading of skills and capital, with a climb up the “ladder”
of primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors largely coinciding with increasingly skill- and
capital-intensive processes. This phenomenon has been applied to China in various ways.
Structural change in China has been analyzed across three sectors and across prov-
inces, in the works of Fan, Fan and Robinson (2003), Fleisher and Yang (2003), Wu and
Yao (2003), Heckman (2005), Au and Henderson (2006), Bhaumik and Estrin (2007),
Bosworth and Collins (2008), and Gong and Lin (2008). Other works use a macroeco-
nomic framework to describe reallocations between private firms and state-owned enter-
prises, as in Song et al. (2011) and Dekle and Vandenbroucke (2012).
China has successfully carried out the structural change from agriculture to industry,
increasing total factor productivity in agriculture by 6.5 % annually between 1991 and
2009 (Cao and Birchenall 2013). Cao and Birchenall (2013) find that total factor prod-
uctivity expansion in the agriculture sector explains most of the reorientation of output
and employment toward rapid non-agricultural productivity growth. Movement away
from a focus on the agricultural sector comprised an important stage of growth in most
other countries. Reforms, which started with the agricultural sector, freed up agricul-
tural labor as productivity rose.
Chen, Jefferson and Zhang (2011) use a stochastic frontier sectoral production function
to examine total factor productivity growth and quantitative growth of inputs. The authors
find that TFP growth exceeded quantitative growth of inputs since 1992, indicating a “struc-
tural bonus” as referred to in Timmer and Szirmai (2000), but that the contribution of TFP
to output growth declines starting in 2001. Structural change embodied in reforms to factor
markets and industrial structure heavily influenced the efficiency of factor allocation over
the period in question. This is because factor markets were underdeveloped, and this
became clear in particular after 2001. Industrial policies began to favor other, high-profit in-
dustries, such as high-tech and heavy industries, which were unable to absorb much labor.
Wang et al (2014) put forth a new structural decomposition analysis model, which inter-
prets the changes in sectoral output production. The authors incorporate, among more
traditional indicators of structural change, the ratio of final goods demand over total output.
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Analysis is applied to three periods, 1992–1997, a high growth phase, especially for the
mechanical and electrical machinery sector; 1997–2002, a soft landing period, in which
growth in the mechanical and electrical machinery sector slowed; and 2002–2006, an initial
stage of a high growth period, which experienced a surge in the mechanical and electrical
machinery sector, combined with declines in the contribution to growth of the agriculture
and services sectors. Findings indicate that the driver of China’s movement toward increased
production of machinery and electrical equipment is external demand for export, while
changes in production technology and import substitution have hindered structural change.
Jiang and Shi (2015) use an Eaton-Kortum model to discern total factor productivity
differences across provinces. The authors find that different sectoral contributions by
province indicate high migration barriers. They conclude that migration barriers actu-
ally expand the provincial manufacturing labor share, and that rich provinces gain less
from inter-provincial trade than poor provinces.
Lee and Malin (2013) use a structural labor model of sector choice to find that 11 % of ag-
gregate growth in output per worker between 1978 and 2004 can be explained by increased
education, with most of the growth (9 %) stemming from sectoral reallocations of labor.
Relatedly, a sizeable literature exists on whether China has reached the Lewis turning
point, moving from a period of surplus labor in the agricultural sector to a period of
rising wages in the agricultural and industrial sectors. This literature indicates that
China may have completed the first phase of development and moved into the second,
modern sector stage. Scholars noticed in the late 2000s that wages were rising and that
labor shortages in some coastal cities were presenting bottlenecks to production. This
led to the rise of such literature, with some authors concluding that China has reached
the turning point, and others finding that it has not. The discussion can be found in
Zhang, Yang and Wang (2011), Zhu and Cai (2012), Cai and Du (2011), Golley and
Meng (2011), Cai (2010), Yao and Zhang (2010), Minami and Ma (2010), and others.
While we do not discuss the Lewis turning point per se, the demographic implications
of these studies are essential to understanding China’s ability to undergo structural change
to a service-based economy. What we can gather from these studies is that: (1) China’s
working age population has recently peaked; (2) demand for migrant workers remains
high in the low-skilled modern urban sector; (3) China has entered a new stage of demo-
graphic transition, with an aging population, before it has become fully affluent or devel-
oped; and (4) improvements in human capital and technology are now more important
than simple labor or capital inputs. China’s financial sector is no exception to these
conclusions. We next describe China’s financial sector and discuss where it is heading.
China’s financial sector
First, we must understand China’s financial sector, its reform status, and where it is
heading in order assess potential structural change in this industry. As is well known,
China’s financial sector continues to be dominated by a small number of major state-
owned banks, while private banks play a minimal role. At the same time, demand for
financing is high among underserved populations such as rural areas and small- and
medium-sized enterprises. Financing constraints among the banking sector gave rise to
the shadow banking sector after 2007, alternative methods of financing that sought to
serve smaller and riskier borrowers. Leveling the playing field among banks and reducing
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regulations would increase competition and efficiency in this sector, and enhance the role
of the financial industry in China’s restructuring process. Not only would improving
competition create employment in this sector, but reducing financing constraints
would complement the growth of other industries.
China’s Big Four banks, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of
China, Agricultural Bank of China, and China Construction Bank, have far more mar-
ket power over the financial industry than do the thousands of other financial institu-
tions. The Big Four comprise 40–50 % of the bank loan market share and 93 % of
banking sector market capital. The industry is therefore moderately oligopolistic. By
contrast, foreign subsidiaries control only about 1 % of the market share. Barriers to
entry in the financial sector are mainly explicit and implicit government preference.
The Big Four Banks, ironically, are less profitable, less efficient, and have lower asset
quality than other types of banks (Lin and Zhang 2009; Fu and Heffernan 2009). In this
way, these firms are atypical oligopolies as to some degree; they are tools of the state.
China’s banking structure contradicts the X-efficiency hypothesis, which says that more
X-efficient banks have lower costs, higher profits, and larger market shares (Demsetz
1973, 1974). China’s X-inefficiency increased between 1985 and 2002, especially among
state-owned banks, indicating a rise in moral hazard (Fu and Heffernan 2009). China’s
banking structure also fails to support the relative scale-efficiency hypothesis, which
finds that banks that are at the appropriate economy of scale will have lower costs and
higher profits that can lead to greater market concentration (Lambson 1987).
Other banks include joint-stock commercial banks, policy banks, credit cooperatives,
and urban commercial banks. All of these together comprise a little over half of lending
activity in China. These institutions, along with the Big Four, are constrained by inter-
est rate ceilings on deposits and lending quotas. Interest rate ceilings on deposits pinch
the potential returns on savings that depositors may earn. In times of higher inflation,
real returns on deposits have even turned out to be negative. Savers have few viable
savings and investment outlets other than bank deposits, and the deposit interest rate
ceiling reinforces their dissatisfaction with China’s financial system. What is more, lend-
ing quotas may restrict the amount of loans that banks can lend.
In recent years, a sizeable shadow banking sector has grown up to serve institutions
that cannot obtain loans from the formal banking sector. The shadow banking sector
includes trust companies, internet lending platforms, credit guarantee companies, and
other institutions, and products include wealth management and trust products,
bankers’ acceptance bills, and entrusted loans. Shadow banking encompasses means
through which riskier and non-state firms can obtain loans, as the formal banking sector
is constrained in its lending. Risks associated with the shadow banking sector are higher
than in the banking system, as credit, liquidity, and solvency risks present substantial
threats among institutions, products, and borrowers.
The bond market includes government and corporate bonds. Government bonds are is-
sued by the MOF, and local governments and Central bank notes and Policy Bank bonds are
most actively traded, but are purchased by state-owned banks. Corporate bonds incur large
transaction costs during the issuance process and have been insufficiently rated by China’s
ratings agencies, leading to potential defaults of companies whose debt quality was overesti-
mated. The stock market is the second largest in the world by equity value but is dominated
by state-owned firms. Market prices are inefficient at present, as an asset price bubble looms.
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Capital controls restrict interaction with the international financial sector. Controls
over currency conversion and flows have been loosened, particularly in the current
account, but persist in the capital account. The question is, however, to what extent do
capital controls stand in the way of domestic financial reform? There are two answers
to this: one is that allowing larger capital inflows for investment purposes would help
to deepen China’s financial system; while the other, contradicting, view, is that China’s
financial system is fragile and must be protected from larger capital inflows. Which
argument would best support financial reform as measured by financial deepening?
Experience tells us that maintaining a fixed (even within a band) currency in conjunction
with porous capital controls and a weak financial system can result in volatile capital flows,
shocking the financial and then real economic sectors. However, if all of these elements are
to be liberalized over time (and we do not underscore the many arguments in favor of
liberalization here—see Eichengreen 2001 and Kose et al 2006 for discussion), there may be
a period in which exposure to capital flows disrupts the economy. To combat this, econo-
mists have advocated for a proper order of financial liberalization. McKinnon (1993) is one
of the heavyweights on the order of economic liberalization. He argues that one of the first
orders of reform should be that interest rates are liberalized to reflect borrowing and lending
costs, and that private debt contracts be enforced through the legal system. Chinn and Ito
(2006) find that increasing financial openness contributes to the development of equity
markets only after a threshold of strong legal systems and institutions is attained and after
some development in the banking sector has also occurred. The authors also find that
liberalization of cross-border goods is a precondition for liberalization of the capital account.
In terms of order of capital and exchange rate liberalization, most scholars contend that first,
the exchange rate and then the capital account should be liberalized (Eichengreen 2007).
The argument is that liberalizing the exchange rate first can reduce speculative pressure.
Expanding flexibility of the exchange rate would ideally take place in periods of
stability in exchange markets, and as a second best position, should occur when the
domestic economy is strong and there are pressures for the currency to appreciate
(Prasad, Rumbaugh, and Wang 2005, Eichengreen and Mussa 1998 and Agénor 2004).
Exchange rate liberalization will help to alleviate “hot money” inflows and outflows
that increase as appreciation and depreciation expectations rise. However, there are
dangers associated with this, including currency speculation, creation of adverse condi-
tions for trade, fluctuation in the real value of foreign debt claims, and generation of infla-
tion. The biggest challenge is maintaining financial stability and minimizing shocks.
Currency speculations trigger a hostile environment of uncertainty. Investors will tend to
shy away from investment. This uncertainty encourages consumer price volatility which is
exacerbated by inflation. This is an adverse environment for trade and economic growth.
McKinnon (2006) points out that even (and especially) Chinese holders of US public debt
may experience deterioration of their assets. Perhaps even more importantly, McKinnon and
Schnabl (2012) state that China cannot fully float its currency since it will not be able to lend
an amount sufficient to balance the trade surplus; the RMB would continue to appreciate
unless the central bank stepped in to purchase dollars. China is seeking to expand lending in
RMB through its Silk Road projects and participation in global lending institutions. Over
time, this will provide China with further room in which to liberalize its exchange rate.
A more flexible exchange rate regime would permit China to support a more inde-
pendent monetary policy, ensuring a buffer against domestic and external shocks that
Hsu and Melchor Simon China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:3 Page 6 of 17
would reduce its vulnerability. In an ever more globalized world, where countries and
economies are becoming more integrated, it is in China’s own benefit to reduce its ex-
posure to potential external macroeconomic shocks. The current overall exposure of
the corporate sector and banks in China to foreign exchange risks appears to have been
growing slowly as it has become an important player in the international arena. Prasad
et al. (2005) however, advocate that China’s banking system is “unlikely to be subject to
substantial stress simply as a result of greater exchange rate flexibility.”
China’s titanic growth has been in great part a result of its trade flows and foreign
direct investment (FDI) inflows. For this reason, many policymakers argue that a more
flexible exchange rate would negatively influence these trade and FDI flows, hindering
China’s growth. On the other hand, studies from Clark, Tamirisa, and Wei (2004) believe
that exchange rate volatility does not influence trade flows significantly. The renminbi’s
real value keeps a close eye on the dollar and maintains a stable exchange rate, whereas,
with its other major trading counterparties, China allows greater exchange volatility. This
behavior does not seem to prove an obstacle for China’s expanding trade strategies in
other countries. Furthermore, the benefits of enjoying macroeconomic stability that could
emanate from increasing exchange rate flexibility could compensate and offset the effects
of reduced trade flows. With a greater flexibility, the Chinese financial market would also
grow deeper and stronger, together with the foreign exchange market.
It is important to note that China need not fully liberalize its exchange rate in order
to create more room for a consumption and market-based economy. China may choose
to follow the example of a nation like South Korea, which has a weakly managed float
in place in order to smooth volatility rather than to manipulate exchange rates. China
may reduce its control over the currency by decreasing intervention in the foreign
exchange market.
Capital account liberalization will help to reduce interest rate differentials between
China and other nations, but this may destabilize the economy where large interest rate
differentials persist. Currency appreciation expectations may surge given rapid capital
inflows, and some basic controls must be put into place to prevent this from occurring.
Barriers to reform of the financial system are many, but some of the most pressing
include leveling the playing field to make banks outside the Big Four more competitive,
fully allowing interest rates to reflect market forces and improving the credit scoring
system. Measures to liberalize interest rates are under way; while the lending floor was
lifted in July 2013 and a new prime lending rate was created in October 2013, steps to
remove the deposit rate ceilings are under way. The PBOC implemented deposit insur-
ance in May 2015 in order to ensure that once deposit interest rate ceilings are lifted,
depositors are protected from risky competitive behavior engaged in by banks. China is
also in the process of implementing a social credit score to rate individuals and firms
based on the credit history and other data. This is expected to be rolled out in 2017.
Local provincial governments are collecting credit information as well to improve lending
at to local institutions.
Banks suffer from some issues with non-performing loans, although the Ministry of
Finance is able to combat this problem by using asset management companies to
purchase non-performing loans. Foreign competition is also restricted.
China’s leadership is well aware of the need for changes and has laid out an ambitious
reform agenda for the financial sector. China’s reform agenda aims to:
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1. open up the financial sector by allowing small private banks to emerge;
2. promote bond and equity finance;
3. improve insurance compensation process;
4. bring about inclusive finance;
5. promote financial innovation;
6. increase exchange and interest rate liberalization;
7. increase capital account liberalization;
8. regulate capital flows within a macroprudential framework;
9. enhance financial regulation; and
10.reform financial institutions’ exit mechanism.
Most banking reforms that have already been carried out have not radically changed




Guidelines on Financial Support for Economic
Restructuring, Transformation and Upgrading




Guiding Opinions on Strengthening Financing
Services to Support SMEs




Implementation Opinion on Providing Financial
Support for Small and Micro Enterprises
Provides new financing options to SMEs
8/30/
2013
Guidelines on Protecting Rights and Interests
of Consumers
Requires banks to improve governance
to protect consumer rights
9/27/
2013




Guidance on Commercial Banks Issuing Corporate
Bonds to Replenish Capital




Notice on Issues Concerning Strengthening the
Supervision on Shadow Banking
Focuses on stabilizing shadow banking
2/14/
2014
General Plan for the Qingdao Wealth Management
Comprehensive Reform Pilot




Measures for the Administration of Service Prices
of Commercial Banks
Regulates commercial banks’ service prices
2/19/
2014
Circular on the Reapproval of Charging Standards
of Supervision Fees for the Banking Sector




Administrative Measures for the Liquidity Risk of
Commercial banks
Implements measure to assess liquidity risk
2/27/
2014
Credit Industry Management Act Calls for social credit information system
3/17/
2014




Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of
Microenterprise and Rural Credit Systems




Notice on Improving and Innovating Loans to Small
and Micro Enterprises to Improve the Financial
Services to Small and Micro Enterprises
Improves loans to small enterprises
7/25/
2014
CBRC Approvals to create Qianhai Weizhong Bank,
Wenzhou Private Bank, and Tianjin Jincheng
Private Bank
Establishes three private banks
9/26/
2014
CBRC Approvals to create Shanghai Huarui Private
Bank and Zhejiang Web Commercial Bank
Establishes private banks
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Source: US-China Business Council (2015)
Small-scale reforms have also worked to provide finance to smaller borrowers in
order to make finance more inclusive. Although some P2P firms have engaged in risky
lending, other internet firms such as Eloan.cn have worked to provide small-scale
finance to SMEs and rural borrowers.
Foreign entry into China’s financial sector began in 2006 as part of China’s commit-
ment to the WTO agreement. Foreign bank activity is highly restricted by Chinese reg-
ulators. Limitations include lending and deposit constraints, foreign exchange
constraints, large capital requirements, and murky regulatory framework (PWC 2014).
The capital account has been opened to a limited extent under the QFII and QDII
programs. Qualified Domestic Retail Investor (QDRI) and Qualified Domestic Individual
Investor (QDII2) programs are also in the making. Under the Qualified Domestic Individ-
ual Investor scheme, individuals in Guangzhou and Shenzhen (at present) can purchase
securities listed on the Hong Kong market. These investors are required to have at least
1.5 million RMB in financial assets. The Qualified Domestic Retail Investor program, still
in the planning stage, would allow citizens to invest in overseas stocks and properties.
Through the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor system, mainland institutions
can invest in foreign exchange products. Approved financial institutions may purchase
and sell foreign currency or RMB-denominated financial products to mainland inves-
tors. Such products include money market instruments, fixed income products, equity
products, mutual funds, and structured products.
The Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect which opened in April 2014 now allows
cross-border stock investment between the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges,
but had a limited impact. Funds will soon be added to sales of cross-border shares
through the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, and a Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock
connect is expected open at the end of 2015. However, strong deviation in prices for
the same stocks sold in Shanghai and Hong Kong has revealed lack of market efficiency
as well as lack of investor sophistication.
Some exchange rate reform has also been carried out. More substantive recent
reform measures include reforming foreign exchange management under companies’
capital accounts, expanding multinational use of foreign exchange, setting up pilot
zones in which foreign companies can convert foreign capital into RMB (US-China
Business Council 2015). Less impactful reforms include promotion of the foreign currency
cash business, simplification of cross-border foreign exchange guarantee, providing
instructions to government bodies on how to expand foreign trade, clarifying procedures
in foreign exchange settlement, and allowing foreign invested banks to convert currency
for operating capital.
The Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone is an example of one of China’s initiatives to im-
plement economic and social reforms in a controlled manner. As announced by the
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) Shanghai branch on 28 February
2014, the Shanghai Free Trade Zone will allow yuan convertibility and unrestricted for-
eign currency exchange. Furthermore, it will also permit a tax-free period of 10 years
for the businesses in the area as a means to simplify the process of FDI and facilitate
the management of capital accounts.
In a nutshell, the Shanghai FTZ’s aim is to facilitate and encourage business. The main
benefits entities within the Shanghai FTZ will benefit from are listed below (McBride 2014).
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1. Simplified cross-border payment procedures—Shanghai FTZ entities can open
capital accounts without prolonged government foreign exchange (FX) registration
approvals, and banks are now authorized to carry out FX registration and Renminbi
(RMB) cross-border settlement directly.
2. Free trade accounts—Shanghai FTZ entities can open free trade accounts (FTA)
and transfer funds freely between FTAs, other offshore accounts, and onshore non-
resident accounts.
3. Loosening of control over cross-border finance—controls over outbound security
and FX finance have been relaxed so Shanghai FTZ entities may now borrow
offshore RMB funds subject to certain requirements (for example, limits on the use
of such offshore RMB funds and maturity profile).
4. RMB convertibility—Shanghai FTZ entities enjoy full capital account RMB
convertibility along with the benefits of future FX reforms (for example, FIEs can
immediately convert foreign exchange into RMB and utilize RMB hedging, whereas
a non-Shanghai FTZ FIE must wait until there is a commercial contract requiring
hard currency payment before it can make the conversion).
5. Deposit rate liberalization—Shanghai FTZ entities may be offered higher interest
rates for foreign exchange and RMB deposits with banks due to the loosening of
the statutory interest rate limits.
However, there is some distance between the current reforms and reform targets and
where the financial sector would be to maximize GDP growth. First, the Big Four
banks’ oligopoly should be ended by eliminating policy favoritism and implicit govern-
ment guarantees. A much better information mechanism needs to be implemented to
judge risk and return, particularly for small and medium sized enterprises, which pro-
vide most of China’s economic growth but remain extremely credit constrained. These
two banking-specific reforms in and of themselves would require massive reorientation
of the banking sector to implement. Government projects should rely less on the Big
Four banks for funding and seek other types of financing, including tax revenue funding,
bond financing (in which bonds would be held by the public rather than mainly banks),
and perhaps loans from designated institutions such as the Policy Banks. Breaking up the
Big Four oligopoly is not even on the reform agenda, but reducing market share of these
institutions would go a long way to freeing up finance for other types of firms.
Development of the bond market is also quite nascent and will take massive effort to
truly marketize and expand. Well-functioning bond markets are prerequisites for relax-
ing capital controls and are channels of transmission for an interest rate-led monetary
policy. China’s bond market has been growing in leaps and bounds: bond issues are on
the rise; market capitalization is expanding substantially; turnover in the secondary
market is surging; and the number and variety of market participants and instruments
are rapidly increasing. After more than 10 years of development, China’s bond market
is now the third largest in the world at about RMB 35.89 trillion, or about USD 4.24
trillion.
China has two bond markets: the interbank bond market, which is regulated by the
People’s Bank of China (PBOC), and the Exchange bond market, which is regulated by
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The interbank market plays the
leading role, accounting for more than 95 % of total trading volume.
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Commercial banks dominate trading activity in China’s interbank bond market, ac-
counting for around 70 % of trading volume (Goldman Sachs 2015). Foreign investors
may access the Chinese bond market through two programs. The first program is the
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program, which allows foreign investors
access to both the Exchange bond market and the interbank bond market. The other
program was launched in 2010 to allow three types of offshore institutions to invest in
China’s largely closed interbank bond market. The qualified institutions include: foreign
central banks, lenders in Hong Kong and Macao that have already conducted renminbi
clearing, and overseas banks involved in renminbi cross-border trade settlement.
When taking a look at China’s fiscal and social landscape, there is pressure to in-
crease public expenditure to cover welfare benefits of an aging population. The popula-
tion also demands higher investments in education, the health system, and labor
protection. These expenditures cannot be financed merely through tax receipts. Thus,
the supply of public bonds would need to rise to meet these demands (Aglietta 2007).
In an attempt to boost demand for its bonds, China has also been allowing more foreign
institutional investors to trade on its interbank market. The decision to eliminate quotas
on interbank trading leads to opening up the bond market and the capital account, but
much more will need to be done to truly develop China’s financial markets. Essential
reforms require better ratings of bonds and better information management.
An important feature of China’s financial development is its stock market growth
since 1991. The Chinese government is highly engaged in fostering a stock market that
can compete with those of developed countries. In order to achieve this objective, the
Chinese Government is committed to apply reforms that affect share issue privatization
(SIP), the reform of non-tradable shares, the reform of firms’ access to the capital
market, the regulation of financial intermediaries, the refinement of the legal system
governing the capital market, the convergence of Chinese accounting standards with
IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards), and audit market reforms.
According to Megginson and Netter, 2001; Gupta, 2005; Shleifer, 1998, share issue
privatization (SIP), in which the government sells shares in state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) to private investors, has been the most profitable and successful method of
privatization since it has contributed to increase firm’s efficiency.
The development and growth of the Chinese stock market must be studied in the
context of the “partial privatization” of SOEs in the 1990s. At the beginning of the
1980s, the Chinese Government launched the SOE reform aiming to decentralize the
central government’s managerial decision rights in SOEs. In the following decade, the
SOEs became partially privatized and began to issue new and minority shares to indi-
vidual investors, who could trade their shares freely on the newly developed Shanghai
and Shenzhen stock markets (set up in early 1990 and 1991, respectively).
The idea was to give birth to a stock market that was representative of the different
geographical regions and industries in China. The central government decided which
subset of SOEs was to be selected and listed. Due to this partial privatization process,
the government could no longer sell controlling stake in the firms. The shares held by
public investors became freely tradable on the stock market, while the shares held by
the state and legal persons were still not tradable.
Lu and Fu (2014) describe China’s privatization strategy as a two-step approach. The
first step is “partial” privatization, which involves SOEs selling a minority stake to
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public investors which are listed on the stock market, while the majority of stakes are
still owned by the State. The second step is known as “complete” privatization, in which
the government sells its controlling rights in selected SOEs to private investors. Chinese
listed companies can be grouped into SOEs controlled by state asset management bureaus
(SAMBs), SOEs affiliated to the central government, and SOEs affiliated to the
local government (Chen, Firth, and Xu, 2009).
The question of capital account opening is difficult to answer—to what extent must
the capital account be opened to induce growth without bringing on too much financial
fragility? The banking system continues to be underdeveloped and is unable to effect-
ively handle risk and return. If the capital account is liberalized and foreign capital
surges into the banking system, there is a good chance that excessive risk will build up
in this sector since channels for obtaining information on borrowers are insufficient.
The same is true for capital inflows into the bond and equity markets, which continue
to be controlled in the types of firms that can finance through these means, which is
not based on risk and return per se. Capital outflows may result in the collapse of the
banking system, which is dependent on funding from deposits.
If the banking, equity, and bond markets were not constrained, the foreign financial
inflows may help to boost growth by funding promising projects. Even so, foreign cap-
ital inflows can also result in currency overvaluation under a liberalized exchange rate
regime and repress export growth. Further, even though economic theory states that
foreign finance will expand the funds available for investment and growth in a develop-
ing country, the relationship between external finance and growth is in practice not
guaranteed. For example, Aizenmann, Pinto and Radziwill (2004) find that for the
1990s, countries that self-financed enjoyed higher growth rates than countries that had
lower levels of self-financing. Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007) provide evidence
that developing countries that rely more on foreign finance have not grown faster in
the long run. The question of capital controls and their growth-distance from capital
account liberalization remains unresolved and we can choose to leave it out of the
equation.
It is possible that capital account and exchange rate liberalization can generate
growth but also uncertainty and volatility, which may present negative shocks. We
therefore examine the potential GDP in China’s financial sector while focusing on
assessing and increasing domestic production inputs while leaving opening up reforms
to later research. We now turn to the model to assess potential growth in the financial
sector, given the present reform trajectory.
Methods: modeling financial sector potential
We calculate potential GDP of the financial sector at present and compare it to the
current GDP to find the output gap at the current level of reform. We also calculate
potential GDP based on assumptions for labor, capital, and TFP given current reforms
and then draw a comparison between the “before” and “after” reform scenarios.
To calculate potential GDP, we use the production function approach followed by
CBO (2001) and Roeger (2006) (and many others) which is rooted in economic theory.
This uses a combination of factor inputs multiplied with the technological level. We
use the Cobb-Douglas production function to illustrate potential GDP.
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Y ¼ ULLELð Þα UKLKð Þ1‐α ¼ LαK1‐α  TFP ð1Þ
where labor L and capital K, checked by excess capacity UL, UK and adjusted for








This equation shows to what extent factors of production are used as well as their
efficiency or technological level.
We use total wage bill for the financial intermediation sector as a measure of labor input,
assuming that the wage bill reflects a real measure of work rather than greed. While we do
know the number of employees for the financial intermediation sector and could calculate
the hours worked based on this, this would also be an estimate as we would have to assume
weeks and hours worked per year and week, respectively. Also, when we compare the two
figures, TFP for analysis using the wage bill is more realistic than for hours worked.
For simplicity, we assume constant returns to scale, which reflects China’s banking
sector reality, as rigorously tested in Fu and Heffernan (2008). We use numbers from
Chow and Li (2002) and Chow (2008) for the Chinese economy as a whole, which
shows that elasticity of labor α is 0.4 and elasticity of capital 1-α is 0.6.
For the capital stock, we use the Penn World Tables Capital Stock table for China which
assumes a 3.1 % rate of depreciation. This uses the perpetual inventory method as the
capital stock becomes a weighted sum of previous capital stock investments. We must still
determine the capital stock in the financial sector. We approximate this by multiplying
the capital stock by the ratio of the financial sector output to total output (GDP).
I ¼ is  YPOT ð3Þ
K¼I þ 1−depð ÞK −1ð Þ2 ð4Þ
Results
Using figures from 2011, we find that TFP is 1.0345 if the capital stock is proportion-
ately used (proportion of capital stock used by the financial sector is found in terms of
the ratio financial sector value added to GDP), 1.563 if half the proportional capital
stock is used, and 2.3767 if one quarter the proportional capital stock is used. The
capital stock estimate includes not only machinery but also computers and software,
which are intensively used in the financial sector. Therefore, we do not believe the
capital stock is lower than ¼ the proportional capital stock.
Since we are working only with the financial sector rather than with the economy as
a whole, we can make various estimations of total potential financial labor force with-
out using the NAIRU and labor force projections for the economy as a whole. Still, we
must come up with a rational projection for the financial sector. Current statistics state
that there were 5,053,000 employees in financial intermediation in 2011. These em-
ployees are mainly college educated.
The rate of unemployment in China is low. Still, among college graduates, unemploy-
ment is relatively higher than among other demographic groups (about 7 million grad-
uates). If 1/20 of these college graduates (say) were employed in the financial sector, an
additional 350,000 workers could be added if the jobs were available. For capital, we as-
sume that ½ the proportionate capital is currently utilized and that if all proportionate
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capital were utilized, the potential capital stock would be twice as large. TFP is there-
fore assumed to be 1.563.
We can then use these equations to calculate potential GDP in China’s financial
sector, and find that it is 3,782,925 million RMB under our assumptions.
The next step is to determine how further reforms would affect potential GDP in the
financial sector. The reform with the largest impact includes encouraging financial
innovation, if risks are appropriately controlled for. The impact of other reforms de-
pends on how they are carried out. First, opening up the financial sector by allowing
small private banks to emerge will likely have little impact on any factors unless many
small private banks are allowed to emerge.
Second, bond and equity finance has a long way to go in terms of truly boosting value
added of the financial industry, so it is unlikely that it will contribute very much in the
short run. Over time, it is possible that the bond market in particular can be overhauled
(the equity market is currently taking backward steps after government intervention).
Third, bringing about inclusive finance may be successful if it promotes employment and
output of SMEs, and this may result in increasing labor elasticity to some degree. Fourth,
promoting financial innovation may increase the elasticity of labor and capital, and will
also likely enhance total factor productivity if it introduces more productivity than risk.
Fifth, increasing exchange rate, capital account, and interest rate liberalization may
have varied effects. Exchange rate and capital account liberalization will depend very
much on whether they properly control for risk and do not remove value added rather
than contributing to it. How much these would contribute to labor, capital, and overall
value added in China’s domestic economy is really a question. There is less debate
about interest rate liberalization, as it appears that more market-based interest rates
would increase efficiency of the financial sector.
Sixth, regulating capital flows within a macroprudential framework, enhancing finan-
cial regulation, and reforming financial institutions’ exit mechanism may increase the
efficiency of labor and capital and also prevent losses that might otherwise occur.
In order to calculate potential GDP under the implementation of reforms, we assume
slightly increasing returns for labor and capital combined and somewhat larger labor
and capital values. We can also assume a small increase in total factor productivity.
Suppose that structural change allows for more people to be employed in the financial
sector as more jobs are created, and along with them, the capital stock is built up. We
assume that structural change boosts labor, capital, and TFP by 10 %, and that elasticity
of capital and labor rise by 0.01 %. This seems reasonable based on the current reform
agenda, as quantity and quality of productive inputs are likely to be increased if all
reforms are carried out.
After performing calculations, we find that potential GDP of China’s financial sector
under these conditions is 5,780,761 million RMB. This is a 53 % increase over the
current potential GDP and a 132 % increase over the current actual GDP.
We do not capture indirect value created by the financial sector in this article. How-
ever, we note that the financial sector is a core component of the economy because it
provides financial capital to the rest of the economy, which multiplies through the
economy as wages are paid and consumed. The larger impact of the financial sector is
even greater, such that a 53 or 132 % increase in GDP created within the financial
sector will result in even greater value added.
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Discussion and policy recommendations
China is on the road to financial reform, albeit at a gradual pace. If the nation were to
implement all of its planned reforms in the financial sector, it could increase GDP and
boost the contribution of services to output. Still, China has yet to implement many of
the reforms, and must increase its pace in order to accomplish its target outcomes.
First, China should focus on reducing the oligopoly of its largest banks in order to in-
crease competition and efficiency within the banking sector. As a result of this, smaller
private banks can be encouraged and have a greater chance of survival. This can also
help to promote inclusive finance. Marketization of the banking sector can also be fur-
ther enhanced by liberalizing deposit interest rates, allowing banks to pay consumers
properly for their savings. This is critically important as alternative savings and invest-
ment channels are opened up to consumers, and will help banks to maintain their
deposit holdings.
Second, China must attempt to increase investment options by reforming its bond
and equity sectors. As we have seen from the equity market boom and bust in the sum-
mer of 2015, which was fraught with government intervention, the market is not ra-
tional and also does not sufficiently reflect firms that provide the greatest sources of
growth. Many changes must be made in the bond and equity markets before these can
become viable sources of yield.
Third, innovation can be an important source of growth, but can also risky. Proper
risks must be controlled for as financial regulation is enhanced, and as failing financial
institutions are given a proper exit mechanism. This will help to check risk in the fi-
nancial sector and allow reforms to flourish.
Without the implementation of these planned reforms, as we can see from our
model, output creation in the financial sector will remain relatively low. China’s slow
progress in the direction of these reforms is positive, but at this pace, the full financial
reform agenda will not be realized in the near future.
Conclusions
China is going through a large structural change. Part of the process includes reforming
the oligopolistic banking sector and other aspects of the financial system. While the
reform agenda is ambitious, relatively slow progress has been made on this list.
In this paper, we have modeled China’s current GDP and potential GDP contribution
of the financial sector, as well as its potential GDP, given planned reforms. We find
that, given even conservative estimates, the value added of the financial intermediation
sector could double, as labor, capital, technology, and elasticity respond to liberalization
policies. Whether potential GDP under reforms is reached is another question; there-
fore, we recommend that China both increase the pace of implementation, focusing in
particular on reducing the oligopoly in the banking sector, increasing investment
options by reforming its bond and equity markets, and enhancing innovation in the
financial sphere while controlling for risk.
Further study may include analysis of ways in which the manufacturing sector can
benefit from financial sector liberalization, and analyses of the potential impacts of
other service subsector liberalization on potential GDP.
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